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Price of Anarchy for Mechanisms with Risk-Averse Agents ∗
Thomas Kesselheim† Bojana Kodric‡
Abstract
We study the price of anarchy of mechanisms in the presence of risk-averse agents. Previ-
ous work has focused on agents with quasilinear utilities, possibly with a budget. Our model
subsumes this as a special case but also captures that agents might be less sensitive to pay-
ments than in the risk-neutral model. We show that many positive price-of-anarchy results
proved in the smoothness framework continue to hold in the more general risk-averse setting.
A sufficient condition is that agents can never end up with negative quasilinear utility after
playing an undominated strategy. This is true, e.g., for first-price and second-price auctions.
For all-pay auctions, similar results do not hold: We show that there are Bayes-Nash equilibria
with arbitrarily bad social welfare compared to the optimum.
1 Introduction
Many practical, “simple” auction mechanisms are not incentive compatible, making it beneficial
for agents to behave strategically. A standard example is the first-price auction, in which one
item is sold to one of n agents. Each of these agents is asked to report a valuation; the item is
given to the agent reporting the highest value, who then has to pay what he/she reported. A
common way to understand the effects of strategic behavior is to study resulting equilibria and
to bound the price of anarchy. That is, one compares the social welfare that is achieved at the
(worst) equilibrium of the induced game to the maximum possible welfare. Typical equilibrium
concepts are Bayes-Nash equilibria and (coarse) correlated equilibria, which extend mixed Nash
equilibria toward incomplete information or learning settings respectively. A key assumption in
these analyses is that agents are risk neutral : Agents are assumed to maximize their expected
quasilinear utility, which is defined to be the difference of the value associated to the outcome and
payment imposed to the agent. So, an agent having a value of 1 for an item would be indifferent
between getting this item with probability 10% for free and getting it all the time, paying 0.9.
However, there are many reasons to believe that agents are not risk neutral. For instance, in
the above example the agent might favor the certain outcome to the uncertain one. Therefore, in
this paper, we ask the question: What “simple” auction mechanisms preserve good performance
guarantees in the presence of risk-averse agents?
The standard model of risk aversion in economics (see, e.g., [19]) is to apply a (weakly) concave
function to the quasilinear term. That is, if agent i’s outcome is xi and his payment is pi, his utility
is given as ui(xi, pi) = hi(vi(xi) − pi), where hi : R → R is a weakly concave, monotone function.
That is, for y, y′ ∈ R and for all λ ∈ [0, 1], it holds that hi(λy+(1−λ)y′) ≥ λhi(y)+ (1−λ)hi(y′).
Agent i is risk neutral if and only if hi is a linear function. If the function is strictly concave,
this has the effect that, by Jensen’s inequality, the utility for fixed xi and pi is higher than for a
randomized xi and pi with the same expected vi(xi)− pi.
We compare outcomes based on their social welfare, which is defined to be the sum of utilities
of all involved parties including the auctioneer. That is, it is the sum of agents’ utilities and their
payments SW(x,p) =
∑
i ui(xi, pi) +
∑
i pi. In the quasilinear setting this definition of social
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welfare coincides with the sum of values
∑
i vi(xi). With risk-averse utilities they usually differ.
However, all our results bound the sum of values and therefore also hold for this benchmark.
We assume that the mechanisms are oblivious to the hi-functions and work like in the quasi-
linear model. Only the individual agent’s perception changes. This makes it necessary to nor-
malize the hi-functions because otherwise they could be on different scales, e.g., if h1(y) = y and
h2(y) = 1000 · y, which would be impossible for the mechanism to cope with without additional
information. Therefore, we will assume that ui(x, pi) = vi(x) if pi = 0 and that ui(x, pi) = 0 if
pi = vi. That is, for the two cases that pi is either 0 or the full value, the utility matches exactly
the quasilinear one. However, due to risk aversion, the agents might be less sensitive to payments.
1
1.1 Our Contribution
We give bounds on the price of anarchy for Bayes-Nash and (coarse) correlated equilibria of
mechanisms in the presence of risk-averse agents. Our positive results are stated within the
smoothness framework, which was introduced by [27]. We use the version that is tailored to
quasilinear utilities by [29], which we extend to mechanism settings with general utilities (for a
formal definition see Section 4). Our main positive result states that the loss of performance
compared to the quasilinear setting is bounded by a constant if a slightly stronger smoothness
condition is fulfilled.
Main Result 1. Given a mechanism with price of anarchy α in the quasilinear model provable
via smoothness such that the deviation guarantees non-negative utility, then this mechanism has
price of anarchy at most 2α in the risk-averse model.
This result relies on the fact that the deviation action to establish smoothness guarantees
agents non-negative utility. A sufficient condition is that all undominated strategies never have
negative utility. First-price and second-price auctions satisfy this condition, we thus get constant
price-of-anarchy bounds for both of these auction formats.
In an all-pay auction every positive bid can lead to negative utility. Therefore, the positive
result does not apply. As a matter of fact, this is not a coincidence because, as we show, equilibria
can be arbitrarily bad.
Main Result 2. The single-item all-pay auction has unbounded price of anarchy for Bayes-Nash
equilibria, even with only three agents.
This means that although equilibria of first-price and all-pay auctions have very similar prop-
erties with quasilinear utilities, in the risk-averse setting they differ a lot. We feel that this to
some extent matches the intuition that agents should be more reluctant to participate in an all-pay
auction compared to a first-price auction.
In our construction for proving Main Result 2, we give a symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium
for two agents. The equilibrium is designed in such a way that a third agent of much higher value
would lose with some probability with every possible bid. Losing in an all-pay auction means that
the agent has to pay without getting anything, resulting in negative utility. In the quasilinear
setting, this negative contribution to the utility would be compensated by respective positive
amounts when winning. For the risk-averse agent in our example, this is not true. Because of the
risk of negative utility, he prefers to opt out of the auction entirely.
We also consider a different model of aversion to uncertainty, in which solution concepts are
modified. Instead of evaluating a distribution over utilities in terms of their expectation, agents
evaluate them based on the expectation minus a second-order term. We find that this model
has entirely different consequences on the price of anarchy. For example, the all-pay auction has
a constant price of anarchy in correlated and Bayes-Nash equilibria, whereas the second-price
auction can have an unbounded price of anarchy in correlated equilibria.
1We note here that this will not in turn allow the mechanism to arrive at huge utility gains, as compared to the
quasilinear model, for example, by increasing payments arbitrarily. Indeed, Lemma 1 in Section 3 will show that
the difference between the two optima is bounded by at most a multiplicative factor of 2.
2
1.2 Related Work
Studying the impact of risk-averseness is a regularly reoccurring theme in the literature. A pro-
posal to distinguish between money and the utility of money, and to model risk aversion by a
utility function that is concave first appeared in [1]. The expected utility theory, which basically
states that the agent’s behavior can be captured by a utility function and the agent behaves as a
maximizer of the expectation of his utility, was postulated in [30]. This theory does not capture
models that are standardly used in portfolio theory, “expectation minus variance” or “expectation
minus standard deviation” [17], the latter of which we also consider in Section 7.
In the context of mechanisms, one usually models risk aversion by concave utility functions.
One research direction in this area is to understand the effects of risk aversion on a given mechanism.
For example, [10] studies symmetric equilibria in all-pay auctions with a homogenous population
of risk-averse players. Due to symmetry and homogeneity, in this case, equilibria are fully efficient,
that is, the price of anarchy is 1. In [21] a similar analysis for auctions with a buyout option is
performed; [14] considers customers with heterogeneous risk attitudes in mechanisms for cloud
resources. In [8] it is shown that for certain classes of mechanisms the correlated equilibrium is
unique and has a specific structure depending on the respective valuations but independent of the
actual utility function. One consequence of this result is that risk aversion does not influence the
allocation outcome or the revenue.
Another direction is to design mechanisms for the risk-averse setting. For example, the optimal
revenue is higher because buyers are less sensitive to payments. In a number of papers, mecha-
nisms for revenue maximization are proposed [22, 20, 28, 15, 2, 11]. Furthermore, randomized
mechanisms that are truthful in expectation lose their incentive properties if agents are not risk
neutral. Black-box transformations from truthful-in-expectation mechanisms into ones that fulfill
stronger properties are given in [7] and [12].
Studying the effects of risk aversion also has a long history in game theory, where different
models of agents’ attitudes towards risk are analyzed. One major question is, for example, if
equilibria still exist and if they can be computed [9, 13]. Price of anarchy analyses have so far only
been carried out for congestion games. Tight bounds on the price of anarchy for atomic congestion
games with affine cost functions under a range of risk-averse decision models are given in [26].
The smoothness framework was introduced by [27]. Among others, [29] tailored it to the
quasilinear case of mechanisms. It is important to remark here that our approach is different
from the one taken by [23]. They use the smoothness framework to prove generalized price of
anarchy bounds for nonatomic congestion games in which players have biased utility functions.
They assume that players are playing the “wrong game” and their point of comparison is the
“true” optimal social welfare, meaning that the biases only determine the equilibira but do not
affect the social welfare. We take the utility functions as they are, including the risk aversion, to
evaluate social welfare in equilibria and also to determine the optimum, which makes our models
incomparable.
For precise relation of von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences to mean-variance preferences,
see for instance [18]. Mean-variance preferences were explored for congestion games in [24, 25],
while [16] studies the bidding behavior in an all-pay auction depending on the level of variance-
averseness.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Setting
We consider the following setting: There is a set N of n players and X is the set of possible
outcomes. Each player i has a utility function uθii , which is parameterized by her type θi ∈ Θi.
Given a type θi, an outcome x ∈ X , and a payment pi ≥ 0, her utility is uθii (x, pi). The
traditionally most studied case are quasilinear utilities, in which types are valuation functions
vi ∈ Vi, vi : X → R and uvii (x, pi) = vi(x)−pi. Throughout this paper, we will refer to quasilinear
utilities by uˆvii .
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For fixed utility functions and types, the social welfare of an outcome x ∈ X and payments
(pi)i∈N is defined as SW
θ(x,p) :=
∑
i∈N u
θi
i (x, pi)+
∑
i∈N pi. In the quasilinear case, this simpli-
fies to
∑
i∈N vi(x). Unless noted otherwise, by OPT(θ), we will refer to the optimal social welfare
under type profile θ, i.e., maxx,p SW
θ(x,p).
A mechanism is a triple (A, X, P ), where for each player i, there is a set of actions Ai and
A = ×iAi is the set of action profiles, X : A → X is an allocation function that maps actions
to outcomes and P : A → Rn+ is a payment function that maps actions to payments pi for each
player i. Given an action profile a ∈ A, we will use the short-hand notation uθii (a) to denote
uθii (X(a), pi).
2.2 Solution Concepts
In the setting of complete information, the type profile θ is fixed. We consider (coarse) correlated
equilibria, which generalize Nash equilibria and are the outcome of (no-regret) learning dynamics.
A correlated equilibrium (CE) is a distribution a over action profiles from A such that for every
player i and every strategy ai in the support of a and every action a
′
i ∈ Ai, player i does not
benefit from switching to a′i whenever he was playing ai. Formally,
Ea−i|ai [ui(a)] ≥ Ea−i|ai [ui(a′i, a−i)], ∀a′i ∈ Ai, ∀i .
In incomplete information, the type of each player is drawn from a distribution Fi over her
type space Θi. The distributions are common knowledge and the draws are independent among
players. The solution concept we consider in this setting is the Bayes-Nash Equilibrium. Here,
the strategy of each player is now a (possibly randomized) function si : Θi → Ai. The equilibrium
is a distribution over these functions si such that each player maximizes her expected utility
conditional on her private information. Formally,
Eθ−i|θi [u
θi
i (s(θ))] ≥ Eθ−i|θi[uθii (ai, s−i(θ−i))], ∀ai ∈ Ai, ∀θi ∈ Θi, ∀i .
The measure of efficiency is the expected social welfare over the types of the players: given a
strategy profile s : ×i Θi → ×iAi, we consider Eθ[SWθ(s(θ))]. We compare the efficiency of our
solution concept with respect to the expected optimal social welfare Eθ[OPT(θ)].
The price of anarchy (PoA) with respect to an equilibrium concept is the worst possible ratio
between the optimal expected welfare and the expected welfare at equilibrium, that is
PoA = max
F
max
D∈EQ(F )
Eθ∼F [OPT(θ)]
Eθ∼F,a∼D[SW
θ(a)]
,
where by F = F1 × · · · × Fn we denote the product distribution of the players’ type distributions
and by EQ(F ) the set of all equilibria, which are probability distributions over action profiles.
We assume that players always have the possibility of not participating, hence any rational
outcome has non-negative utility in expectation over the non-available information and the ran-
domness of other players and the mechanism.
3 Modeling Risk Aversion
When modeling risk aversion, one wants to capture the fact that a random payoff (lottery) X is
less preferred than a deterministic one of value E[X ]. The standard approach is, therefore, to
apply a concave non-decreasing function h : R→ R to X and consider h(X) instead. By Jensen’s
inequality, we now know E[h(X)] ≤ h(E[X ]).
In the case of mechanism design, the utility of a risk-neutral agent is defined as the quasilinear
utility vi(x) − pi. That is, if an agent has a value of 1 for an item and has to pay 0.9 for it, then
the resulting utility is 0.1. The expected utility is identical if the agent only gets the item with
probability 0.1 for free. To capture the effect that the agent prefers the certain outcome to the
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ui(x, pi)
vi(x)
vi(x) Figure 1: Normalized risk-averse util-
ity function (bold) and quasilinear util-
ity function for a fixed allocation x and
varying payment pi.
uncertain one, we again apply a concave function hi : R → R to the quasilinear term vi(x) − pi.
We then consider utility functions ui(x, pi) = hi(vi(x) − pi) in the setting described in Section 2.
Note that the mechanisms we consider do not know the hi-functions. They work as if all utility
functions were quasilinear.
We want to compare outcomes based on their social welfare. We use the definition of so-
cial welfare being the sum of utilities of all involved parties including the auctioneer. That is,
SW(x,p) =
∑
i∈N ui(x, pi) +
∑
i∈N pi. It is impossible for any mechanism to choose good out-
comes for this benchmark if the hi-function are arbitrary and unknown. Therefore, we assume
that utility functions are normalized so that the utility matches the quasilinear one for pi = 0 and
pi = vi(x) (see Figure 1). In more detail, we assume the following normalized risk-averse utilities :
1. uvii (x, pi) ≥ uvii (x, p′i) if pi ≤ p′i (monotonicity)
2. uvii (x, pi) = 0 if pi = vi(x) (normalization at pi = vi(x))
3. uvii (x, pi) = vi(x) if pi = 0 (normalization at pi = 0)
4. uvii (x, pi) ≥ vi(x) − pi if 0 ≤ pi ≤ vi(x) and uvii (x, pi) ≤ vi(x) − pi otherwise (relaxed
concavity)
Assumption 4 is a relaxed version of concavity that suffices our needs for the positive results.
Our negative results always fulfill concavity.
As an effect of normalization, the optimal social welfare of the risk-averse setting can be
bounded in terms of the optimal sum of values, which coincides with the social welfare for quasi-
linear utilities.
Lemma 1. Given valuation functions (vi)i∈N and normalized risk-averse utilities (u
vi
i )i∈N , let
OPT denote the optimal social welfare with respect to utilities (uvii )i∈N and ÔPT denote the optimal
social welfare with respect to quasilinear utilities (uˆvii )i∈N . Then, OPT ≤ 2ÔPT.
Proof. Let x, p denote the outcome and payment profile that maximizes the social welfare∑
i∈N u
vi
i (x, pi) +
∑
i∈N pi. Consider a fixed player i. If 0 ≤ pi ≤ vi(x), then by monotonic-
ity of uvii (x, ·) and Assumption 3, uvii (x, pi) + pi ≤ uvii (x, 0) + pi ≤ 2vi(x). If pi > vi(x), then we
know from Assumption 4 that uvii (x, pi) + pi ≤ vi(x). So, always, uvii (x, pi) + pi ≤ 2vi(x).
By taking the sum over all players, we get OPT =
∑
i∈N u
vi
i (x, pi)+
∑
i∈N pi ≤
∑
i∈N 2vi(x) ≤
2ÔPT.
As a consequence, the optimal social welfare changes only within a factor of 2 by risk aversion
and we may as well take ÔPT as our point of comparison. A VCG mechanism, for example, is
still incentive compatible under risk-averse utilities but optimizes the wrong objective function.
Lemma 1 shows that it is still a constant-factor approximation to optimal social welfare. However,
in simple mechanisms, the agents’ strategic behavior may or may not change drastically under risk
aversion, depending on the mechanism. This way, equilbria and outcomes can possibly be very
different.
5
4 Smoothness Beyond Quasilinear Utilities
Most of our positive results rely on the smoothness framework. It was introduced by [27] for
general games. There are multiple adaptations to the quasilinear mechanism-design setting. We
will use the one by [29]. As our utility functions will not be quasilinear, in this section we first
observe that the framework can be extended to general utility functions. Note that throughout
this section, the exact definition of OPT(θ) is irrelevant. Therefore, it can be set to the optimal
social welfare but also to weaker benchmarks depending on the setting.
Definition 2 (Smooth Mechanism). A mechanism M is (λ, µ)-smooth with respect to utility
functions (uθii )θi∈Θi,i∈N for λ, µ ≥ 0, if for any type profile θ ∈ ×iΘi and for any action profile
a there exists a randomized action a∗i (θ, ai) for each player i, such that
∑
i u
θi
i (a
∗
i (θ, ai), a−i) ≥
λOPT(θ) − µ∑i pi(a). We denote by uθii (a) the expected utility of a player if a is a vector of
randomized strategies.
Mechanism smoothness implies bounds on the price of anarchy. The following theorem and
its proof are analogous to the theorems in [29], the proof is therefore deferred to the Appendix,
Section A. In cases where the deviation required by smoothness does not depend on ai, the results
extend to coarse correlated equilibria. The important point is that the respective bounds mostly
do not depend on the assumption of quasilinearity.
Theorem 3. If a mechanism M is (λ, µ)-smooth w.r.t. utility functions (uθii )θi∈Θi,i∈N , then any
Correlated Equilibrium in the full information setting and any Bayes-Nash Equilibrium in the
Bayesian setting achieves efficiency of at least λmax{1,µ} of OPT(θ) or of Eθ[OPT(θ)], respectively.
In the standard single-item setting, one item is auctioned among n players, with their valuations
and actions (bids) both being real numbers. In the common auction formats, the item is given to
the bidder with the highest bid.
In a first-price auction, the winner has to pay her bid; the other players do not pay anything. It
is (1− 1/e, 1)-smooth w.r.t. quasilinear utility functions. In an all-pay auction, all players have to
pay their bid. It is (1/2, 1)-smooth w.r.t. quasilinear utility functions. These smoothness results
were given by [29]. They also show that simultaneous and sequential compositions of smooth
mechanisms are again smooth.
What is remarkable here is that first-price and all-pay auctions achieve nearly the same welfare
guarantees. We will show that in the risk-averse setting this is not true. While the first-price
auction almost preserves its constant price of anarchy, the all-pay auction has an unbounded price
of anarchy, even with only three players.
5 Quasilinear Smoothness Often Implies Risk-Averse Smooth-
ness (Main Result 1)
Our main positive result is that many price-of-anarchy guarantees that are proved via smoothness
in the quasilinear setting transfer to the risk-averse one. First, we consider mechanisms that are
(λ, µ)-smooth with respect to quasilinear utility functions. We show that if the deviation strategy
a∗ that is used to establish smoothness ensures non-negative utility, then the price-of-anarchy
bound extends to risk-averse settings at a multiplicative constant loss.
Theorem 4. If a mechanism is (λ, µ)-smooth w.r.t. quasilinear utility functions (uˆvii )i∈N,vi∈Vi
and the actions in the support of the smoothness deviations satisfy uˆi(a
∗
i , a−i) ≥ 0, ∀a−i, ∀i, then
any Correlated Equilibrium in the full information setting and any Bayes-Nash Equilibrium in the
Bayesian setting achieves efficiency at least λ2·max{1,µ} of the expected optimal even in the presence
of risk averse bidders.
Using Theorem 3, it suffices to prove the following lemma.
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Lemma 5. If a mechanism is (λ, µ)-smooth w.r.t. quasilinear utility functions (uˆvii )i∈N,vi∈Vi and
the actions in the support of the smoothness deviations satisfy
uˆi(a
∗
i , a−i) ≥ 0, ∀a−i, ∀i , (1)
then the mechanism is (λ/2, µ)-smooth with respect to any normalized risk-averse utility functions
(uvii )i∈N,vi∈Vi .
Proof. We start from an arbitrary action profile a and want to satisfy Definition 2. Since there
exist smoothness deviations s.t. uˆi(a
∗
i , a−i) = vi(x(a
∗
i , a−i)) − pi ≥ 0, ∀a−i, ∀i, we know from
property 4 of the risk aversion definition that uvii (a
∗
i , a−i) ≥ uˆvii (a∗i , a−i). Therefore,
∑
i
uvii (a
∗
i , a−i) ≥
∑
i
uˆvii (a
∗
i , a−i) ≥ λÔPT− µ
∑
i
pi(a) ≥ λ
2
OPT− µ
∑
i
pi(a) ,
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 1.
Note that in order for (1) to hold, it is sufficient if all undominated strategies guarantee non-
negative quasilinear utility. For example, in a first-price auction, the only undominated bids are
the ones from 0 to vi. Regardless of the other players’ bids, these can never result in negative
utilities.
Corollary 6. Under normalized risk-averse utilities, the first-price auction has a constant price
of anarchy for correlated and Bayes-Nash equilibria.
We in addition note here that the first part of Property 4 of the normalization assumption,
uvii (x, pi) ≥ vi(x) − pi, 0 ≤ pi ≤ vi(x), is not crucial for obtaining a result similar to Theorem 4.
Indeed, a relaxation of the form uvii (x, pi) ≥ C · (vi(x) − pi), 0 ≤ pi ≤ vi(x) for 0 < C < 1, C
constant, would incur a loss of at most a factor of C in the efficiency bound of Theorem 4. More
details can be found in the Appendix, Section B.
For second-price auctions and their generalizations, for example, the just stated theorems do
not suffice to prove guarantees on the quality of equilibria. One in addition needs a no-overbidding
assumption and this is further taken care of in the framework of weak smoothness, also introduced
in [29]. We defer all definitions and results that deal with weak smoothness, including the extension
from quasilinear to general utility functions and risk-averse utilities yielding a constant loss as
compared to the quasilinear case, to the Appendix, Section C.
We also consider the setting where players have hard budget constraints. Note that in this
case the players’ preferences are not quasilinear already in the risk neutral case. Informally, we
show that if a mechanism is (λ, µ)-smooth w.r.t. quasilinear utility functions, then the loss of
performance in the budgeted setting is bounded by a constant, even in the presence of risk-averse
agents. All details can be found in Section D of the Appendix.
6 Unbounded Price of Anarchy for All-Pay Auctions (Main
Result 2)
From the previous section, we infer that the constant price-of-anarchy bounds for first-price and
second-price auctions immediately extend to the risk-averse setting. This is not true for all-pay
auctions; by definition there is no non-trivial bid that always ensures non-negative utility. Indeed,
as we show in this section, the price of anarchy is unbounded in the presence of risk-averse players.
Missing calculation details can be found in the Appendix, Section E.1.
Theorem 7. In an all-pay auction with risk-averse players, the PoA is unbounded.
The general idea is to construct a Bayes-Nash equilibrium with two players that very rarely
have high values and only then bid high values. We then add a third player who always has a high
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value. However, as the first two players bid high values occasionally, there is no possible bid that
ensures he will surely win. This means, any bid has a small probability of not getting the item but
having to pay. Risk-averse players are more inclined to avoid this kind of lotteries. In particular,
making our third player risk-averse enough, he prefers the sure zero utility of not participating to
any way of bidding that always comes with a small probability of negative utility.
Proof of Theorem 7. We consider two (mildly) risk-averse players who both have the same valua-
tion distributions and a third (very) risk-averse player with a constant value. For a large number
M > 5, the first two players have values v1 and v2 drawn independently from distributions with
density functions of value 2 · (1 − (M − 1) · ε) on the interval [1/2, 1) and value ε on the interval
[1,M ], where ε = 1/M2. The third player always has value 1/3 · ln(M/2) for winning.
We will construct a symmetric pure Bayes-Nash equilibrium involving only the first two players.
It will be designed such that for the third player it is a best response to always bid 0, i.e., to opt
out of the mechanism and never win the item. So, the combination of these strategies will be a
pure Bayes-Nash equilibrium for all three players.
Note that the social welfare of any equilibrium of this form is upper-bounded by the optimal
social welfare that can be achieved by the first two bidders. By Lemma 1, it is bounded by
E[SW] ≤ 2 · E[max{v1, v2}] ≤ 2 · E[v1 + v2] = 2 · (E[v1] + E[v2]) = 4 · E[v1] ≤ 4 .
Furthermore, the third player’s value v3 = 1/3 · ln(M/2) is a lower bound to the optimal social
welfare in the construction containing all three players. So, as pointwise OPT(v) ≥ 1/3 · ln(M/2),
where v = (v1, v2, v3) ∈ V denotes the valuation profile, this implies that the price of anarchy can
be arbitrarily high.
We define the utility functions by setting
uvii (bi) =
{
hi(vi−bi)
h(vi)
· vi if bi is the winning bid
hi(−bi)
h(vi)
· vi otherwise
(2)
For the first two players, we use hi(x) := 1 − e−x, i ∈ {1, 2}, so in particular increasing and
concave. For the third player, we set hi(x) = x for x ≥ 0 and hi(x) = C · x for x < 0, where
C = (16 · 13 · lnM/2) ·M2 ≥ 1. Again this function is increasing and concave2. Note that the utility
functions also satisfy normalizations at pi = vi(x) and at pi = 0. We see that in this example risk
aversion has the effect of heavily penalizing payments without winning the auction.
Claim 8. With the third player not participating, it is a symmetric pure Bayes-Nash equilibrium
for the first two players to play according to bidding function β : Vi → R+, i ∈ {1, 2}, such that
β(x) =
∫ x
1
2
f(t)(et − 1)
F (t) + (1− F (t))et dt , (3)
where F denotes the cumulative distribution function of the value and f denotes its density.
Proof. We will argue that playing according to β is always the unique best response if the other
player is playing according to β, too. Due to symmetry reasons, it is enough to argue about the
first player.
Let us fix player 1’s value v1 = x and consider the function g : R≥0 → R that is defined by
g(y) = E[ux1(b1 = y, b2 = β(v2), b3 = 0)]. We claim that g is indeed maximized at y = β(x). We
2Its slope is not an absolute constant. This is indeed necessary because the price of anarchy can be bounded in
terms of the slopes of the hi-functions as we show in Appendix E.2.
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have3
g(y) = Pr[β(v2) ≤ y] · h1(x − y)
h1(x)
· x+ (1− Pr[β(v2) ≤ y]) · h1(−y)
h1(x)
· x
=
x
h1(x)
[
F (β−1(y))
(
h1(x − y)− h1(−y)
)
+ h1(−y)
]
= xeyF (β−1(y)) +
x(1 − ey)
1− e−x .
The first derivative of this function is given by
g′(y) = xeyF (β−1(y)) + xey
d
dy
F (β−1(y))− x
1− e−x e
y .
The inverse function theorem implies ddyF (β
−1(y)) = f(β
−1(y))
β′(β−1(y)) . Furthermore, as β
′(t) = f(t)(e
t−1)
F (t)+(1−F (t))et ,
we get for all t that f(t)β′(t) =
F (t)+(1−F (t))et
et−1 = (1− F (t)) + 1et−1 . This simplifies g′(y) to
g′(y) = xey +
xey
eβ−1(y) − 1 −
xey
1− e−x =
xey
(1 − e−x)(eβ−1(y) − 1)
(
1− e−x+β−1(y)
)
.
Notice that the factor xe
y
(1−e−x)(eβ−1(y)−1)
is always positive. Therefore, we observe that g′(y) = 0 if
and only if e−x+β
−1(y) = 1, which is equivalent to y = β(x). Furthermore, g′(y) > 0 for y < β(x)
and g′(y) < 0 for y > β(x). This means that y = β(x) has to be the (unique) global maximum of
g(y).
Claim 9. If the first two players are bidding according to (3), then it is a best response for the
third player to always bid 0.
Proof. We now show that the very risk-averse third player with valuation 1/3 · ln(M/2) will indeed
bid 0 because every bid b′3 > 0 will cause negative expected utility.
We distinguish two cases. For values of b′3 >
1
16 , we use that with a small probability one of
the two remaining players has a valuation of at least M − 1, which leads to negative utility. For
b′3 ≤ 116 on the other hand, he loses so often that his expected utility is again negative.
Let us first assume that the third player bids b′3 with
1
16 < b
′
3 ≤ v3. In this case, with probability
more than ε one of the first two players has value of at least M − 1. The bid of this player with
vi ≥M − 1 can be estimated as follows
β(vi) ≥ β(M − 1) ≥
∫ M−1
M/2
f(t)(et − 1)
1 + (1 − F (t))et dt =
∫ M−1
M/2
ε(et − 1)
1 + ε(M − t)et dt
≥ 1
2
(1− e−M2 )
∫ M−1
M/2
εet
ε(M − t)et dt =
1
2
(1− e−M2 ) ln(M/2) > 1
3
ln(M/2) ,
which means that by bidding b′3 the third player loses with probability of at least ε = 1/M
2. For
the expected utility, this implies
E[u3(b
′
3,b−3)] ≤ (1− ε)(v3 − b′3) + ε(−C · b′3) <
1
3
ln
M
2
− 1
16
· 16 · 1
3
ln
M
2
= 0 .
In the case where the third player bids b′3, 0 < b
′
3 ≤ 116 , we need to be a bit more careful with
estimating the winning probability. We first give a lower bound on the bidding function of the
first player for v1 < 1
β(v1) ≥
∫ v1
1/2
2(1− M−1M2 )(et − 1)
2(t− 12 )(1 − M−1M2 ) + (1− 2(t− 12 )(1 − M−1M2 )) · et
dt >
1
4
(
v1 − 1
2
)
.
3Note that the first step assumes tie breaking in favor of player 1. This is irrelevant for the future steps as the
involved probability distributions are continuous.
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Since for v1 ≥ 1, β(v1) > 116 with probability 1, this implies that with b′3, the third player has a
winning probability of at most
Pr[β(v1) ≤ b′3] ≤ Pr
[
1
4
(
v1 − 1
2
)
≤ b′3
]
= Pr
[
v1 ≤ 4b′3 +
1
2
]
< 2 · 4b′3 .
Now, having in mind that C = (16v3) ·M2 ≥ 32 · v3, the utility can be estimated as follows
E[u3(b
′
3,b−3)] ≤ Pr[β(v1) ≤ b′3] · (v3 − b′3)− Pr[β(v1) > b′3] · 32 · v3 · b′3
< 8b′3
(
−v3 − 1
16
)
< 0 .
So also in this case, the expected utility is negative.
Combining the two claims, we have constructed a class of distributions and Bayes-Nash equi-
libria with unbounded price of anarchy.
As a final remark, we note that the first two bidders occasionally bid high only due to risk
aversion. In a symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the all-pay auction in the quasilinear setting,
all bids are always bounded by the expected value of a player (see Appendix E.3). Therefore, such
an equilibrium would not work as a point of departure.
7 Variance-Aversion Model
In this section, we consider a different model that tries to capture the effect that agents prefer
certain outcomes to uncertain ones. It is inspired by similar models in game theory and penalizes
variance of random variables. Rather than reflecting the aversion in the utility functions, it is
modeled by adapting the solution concept.
In the usual definition of equilibria involving randomization, the utility of a randomized strategy
profile is set to be the expectation over the pure strategies. The definition we consider here
is modified by subtracting the respective standard deviation. For a player i, the utility of a
randomized strategy profile a is given as uvii (a) = Eb∼a[uˆ
vi
i (b)] − γ
√
Var[uˆvii (b)], so a player’s
utility for an action profile is his expected quasilinear utility for this profile minus the standard
deviation multiplied by a parameter γ that determines the degree of variance-averseness, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1.
As already mentioned, uˆi(a) denotes the quasilinear utility of player i for the action profile a.
Bayes-Nash Equilibria and correlated equilibria can be defined the same way as before, al-
ways replacing expectations by the difference of expectation and standard deviation. The formal
definition for s(v) being a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in this setting is that ∀i ∈ N , ∀vi ∈ Θi, ai ∈ Ai,
Ev−i [uˆ
vi
i (s(v)) | vi]− γ
√
Var[uˆvii (s(v)) | vi]
≥ Ev−i [uˆvii (ai, s−i(v−i)) | vi]− γ
√
Var[uˆvii (ai, s−i(v−i)) | vi] .
Note that we again evaluate social welfare as agents perceive it. That is, for a randomized
strategy profile a, we set SWv(a) =
∑
i u
vi
i (a) +
∑
i pi(a).
Our first result shows that first-price and notably also all-pay auctions have a constant price
of anarchy in this setting. Note that even though the proof looks a lot like smoothness proofs, it
is not possible to phrase it within the smoothness framework, since here we are dealing with a
different solution concept.
Theorem 10. Bayes-Nash Equilibria and Correlated Equilibria of the first-price and all-pay auc-
tion have a constant price of anarchy in this model.
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Proof. For simplicity, we will show the claim only for Bayes-Nash equilibria. The proof for corre-
lated equilibria works the same way with minor modifications to the notation.
Assume b is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. We claim that Ev [SW
v(b)] ≥ 116 · Ev[OPT] , where
OPT denotes the value of social welfare in the allocation that maximizes it, i.e. maximized sum
of utility and payments of the agents.
Consider a fixed player j and a fixed valuation vj . Let q = Pr[maxi6=j bi ≤ 14 · vj ] denote the
probability that no other player’s bid exceeds 14 · vj .
Assume first that q ≤ 34 . Then, because the total social welfare lower bounded by the payments
Ev−j |vj [SW
v(b)] ≥ (1− q)14vj ≥ 116vj .
On the other hand, if q ≥ 34 , since Ev−j |vj [SWv(b)] ≥ Ev−j |vj
[
u
vj
j (
vj
4 , b−j)
]
,
Ev−j |vj [SW
v(b)] ≥ vjq − 1
4
vj − γvj
√
q(1− q) ≥
(
2− γ√3
4
)
vj ≥ 1
16
vj ,
where the first inequality is in fact an equality for the all-pay auction.
From here, by taking the expectation over vj and by weighing the right hand side by the
probability that OPT takes a particular agent, the theorem follows.
This is contrasted by a correlated equilibrium with 0 social welfare in a setting with positive
values. Indeed, for the special case of λ = 1, we see that the variance-averse model further differs
from the risk-averse model described in previous sections.
Observation 1. The PoA for CE of second price auctions is unbounded if γ = 1.
The proof can be found in the Appendix, Section F. This is not only a difference between
smoothness and weak smoothness. Our final result is a mechanism that is (λ, µ)-smooth for
constant λ and µ but has unbounded price of anarchy.
Theorem 11. For any constant γ > 0 there is a mechanism that is (λ, µ)-smooth with respect
to quasilinear utility functions for constant λ and µ but has unbounded price of anarchy in the
variance-aversion model.
Proof. Consider a setting with two items and two players, who have unit-demand valuation func-
tions such that 1cvi,1 ≤ vi,2 ≤ cvi,1 for constant c ≥ 1. The players’ possible actions are to either
report one of the two items as preferred or to opt out entirely. Our mechanism first assigns player
1 her (claimed) favorite item, then assigns player 2 the remaining one unless she opts out. There
are no payments. Obviously, this mechanism is (1c , 0)-smooth because the allocation is within a
1
c -factor of the optimal allocation by construction.
We will now construct a mixed Nash equilibrium of bad welfare. To this end, let v1,1 = v1,2 = ε
for some small ε > 0. This makes player 1 indifferent between items 1 and 2. In particular, it is a
best response to ask for item 1 with probability q−1q and for item 2 with probability
1
q . We note
at this point that in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium we could make this respective action the unique
best response by having random types.
For player 2, we set v2,1 = c, v2,2 = 1. She has the choice of participating or opting out. Opting
out implies utility 0, whereas participating implies
u2(a) =
c+ q − 1
q
− γ
√
(c− 1)2(q − 1)
q2
=
(c− 1)(1− γ√q − 1)
q
+ 1
Now, if we set q = c − 1, then u2(a) = 2− γ
√
c− 2 which is negative for c > 4γ2 + 2. We further
set c = 4γ2 +3. That is, player 2 prefers to opt out. This outcome has social welfare ε whereas the
optimal social welfare is c.
Note that this last example shows that variance-averseness yields very strange preferences
for lotteries. In our example, the variance-averse player prefers not to participate although any
outcome in the (free) lottery has positive value.
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A Proof of Theorem 3
A.1 Full Information Setting
Proof. Let a be a correlated equilibrium. This means that for every ai in the support of a
Ea−i|ai [u
θi
i (ai, a−i)] ≥ Ea−i|ai [uθii (a′i, a−i)], ∀a′i ∈ Ai, ∀i .
Applying the equilibrium property to a′i = a
∗
i (θ, ai), we know that for every ai in the support of
a:
Ea−i|ai [u
θi
i (ai, a−i)] ≥ Ea−i|ai [uθii (a∗i (θ, ai), a−i)], ∀i .
If we now take the expectation over ai and add over all players:
Ea[
∑
i
uθii (a)] ≥ Ea[
∑
i
uθii (a
∗
i (θ, ai), a−i)] ≥ λOPT(θ)− µEa[
∑
i
pi(a)] ,
and further by adding Ea[
∑
i pi(a)] to both sides
Ea[
∑
i
uθii (a) +
∑
i
pi(a)] ≥ Ea[
∑
i
uθii (a
∗
i (θ, ai), a−i)]
≥ λOPT(θ) + (1 − µ)Ea[
∑
i
pi(a)] .
The result follows by doing a case distinction over µ ≤ 1 and µ > 1. In the first case, we
immediately get
Ea[
∑
i
uθii (a) +
∑
i
pi(a)] ≥ λOPT(θ) + (1− µ)Ea[
∑
i
pi(a)] ≥ λOPT(θ) ,
and in the latter case we use the fact that Ea[
∑
i u
θi
i (a)] ≥ 0. Then also
Ea[
∑
i
uθii (a)] + Ea[
∑
i
pi(a)] ≥ Ea[
∑
i
pi(a)] ,
which results in
Ea[
∑
i
uθii (a) +
∑
i
pi(a)] ≥ λOPT(θ) + (1 − µ)Ea[
∑
i
uθii (a) +
∑
i
pi(a)]
and finally
Ea[
∑
i
uθii (a) +
∑
i
pi(a)] ≥ λ
µ
OPT(θ) .
A.2 Bayesian Setting
Proof. For reasons of clarity, we prove the claim for the simpler case of pure BNE. First, we let
each player i sample a type profile ζ ∼ ×iFi and play a∗i ((θi, ζ−i), si(ζi)).
Eθ[u
θi
i (s(θ))] ≥ Eθ,ζ [uθii (a∗i ((θi, ζ−i), si(ζi)), s−i(θ−i))]
= Eθ,ζ [u
ζi
i (a
∗
i ((ζi, ζ−i), si(θi)), s−i(θ−i))]
= Eθ,ζ [u
ζi
i (a
∗
i (ζ, si(θi)), s−i(θ−i))]
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Summing over the players and using the smoothness property, we get
Eθ
[∑
i
uθii (s(θ))
]
≥ Eθ,ζ
[∑
i
uζii (a
∗
i (ζ, si(θi)), s−i(θ−i))
]
≥ Eθ,ζ
[
λOPT(ζ)− µ
∑
i
pi(s(θ))
]
= λEθ [OPT(θ)]− µEθ
[∑
i
pi(s(θ))
]
,
and therefore
Eθ
[∑
i
uθii (s(θ)) +
∑
i
pi(s(θ))
]
≥ λEθ [OPT(θ)] + (1 − µ)Eθ
[∑
i
pi(s(θ))
]
,
from where the result follows by case distinction over µ, as in the proof for the full information
setting.
The generalization to a mixed Bayes-Nash equilibrium is now straightforward.
B Relaxation of the normalization assumption
We assume the following relaxed normalized risk-averse utilities :
1. uvii (x, pi) ≥ uvii (x, p′i) if pi ≤ p′i (monotonicity)
2. uvii (x, pi) = 0 if pi = vi(x) (normalization at pi = vi(x))
3. uvii (x, pi) = vi(x) if pi = 0 (normalization at pi = 0)
4. uvii (x, pi) ≥ C ·(vi(x)−pi) if 0 ≤ pi ≤ vi(x), 0 < C < 1, C constant and uvii (x, pi) ≤ vi(x)−pi
otherwise (extra relaxed concavity)
Lemma 12. If a mechanism is (λ, µ)-smooth w.r.t. quasilinear utility functions (uˆvii )i∈N,vi∈Vi
and the actions in the support of the smoothness deviations satisfy
uˆi(a
∗
i , a−i) ≥ 0, ∀a−i, ∀i , (4)
then the mechanism is (C · λ/2, C · µ)-smooth with respect to any relaxed normalized risk-averse
utility functions (uvii )i∈N,vi∈Vi .
Proof. We start from an arbitrary action profile a and want to satisfy Definition 2. Since there
exist smoothness deviations s.t. uˆi(a
∗
i , a−i) = vi(x(a
∗
i , a−i)) − pi ≥ 0, ∀a−i, ∀i, we know from
property 4 of the relaxed risk aversion definition that uvii (a
∗
i , a−i) ≥ C · uˆvii (a∗i , a−i). Therefore,∑
i
uvii (a
∗
i , a−i) ≥
∑
i
C · uˆvii (a∗i , a−i) ≥ C · λÔPT− C · µ
∑
i
pi(a)
≥ C · λ
2
OPT− C · µ
∑
i
pi(a) ,
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 1.
Using Theorem 3, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 13. If a mechanism is (λ, µ)-smooth w.r.t. quasilinear utility functions (uˆvii )i∈N,vi∈Vi
and the actions in the support of the smoothness deviations satisfy uˆi(a
∗
i , a−i) ≥ 0, ∀a−i, ∀i, then
any Correlated Equilibrium in the full information setting and any Bayes-Nash Equilibrium in
the Bayesian setting achieves efficiency at least C·λ2·max{1,C·µ} of the expected optimal even in the
presence of risk averse bidders.
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C Weak Smoothness
C.1 Extension to General Utility Functions
For second-price auctions and their generalizations, for example, the already stated theorems do
not suffice to prove guarantees on the quality of equilibria. One in addition needs a no-overbidding
assumption. To state this assumption, we first need the notion of willingness-to-pay that was
originally defined in [29].
Definition 14 (Willingness-to-pay). Given a mechanism (A, X, P ) a player’s maximum willingness-
to-pay for an allocation x when using strategy ai is defined as the maximum he could ever pay
conditional on allocation x:
Wi(ai,x) = max
a−i:X(a)=x
pi(a) .
Now, we can state weak smoothness.
Definition 15 (Weakly Smooth Mechanism). A mechanism M is weakly (λ, µ1, µ2)-smooth with
respect to utility functions (uθii )θi∈Θi,i∈N for λ, µ1, µ2 ≥ 0, if for any type profile θ ∈ ×iΘi and
for any action profile a there exists a randomized action a∗i (θ, ai) for each player i, s.t.:∑
i
uθii (a
∗
i (θ, ai), a−i) ≥ λOPT(θ)− µ1
∑
i
pi(a)− µ2
∑
i
Wi(ai, X(a)) .
We denote by uθii (a) the expected utility of a player if a is a vector of randomized strategies.
Note that (λ, µ)-smoothness implies weak (λ, µ, 0)-smoothness. We get the following generaliza-
tion of the price-of-anarchy guarantees for equilibria that fulfill the aforementioned no-overbidding
assumption on the players’ willigness-to-pay:
Theorem 16. If a mechanism is weakly (λ, µ1, µ2)-smooth w.r.t. utility functions (u
θi
i )θi∈Θi,i∈N ,
then any Correlated Equilibrium in the full information setting and any Bayes-Nash Equilibrium
in the Bayesian setting that satisfies
Ea[Wi(ai, X(a))] ≤ Ea[uθii (a) + pi(a)] (5)
achieves efficiency of at least λ(µ2+max{µ1,1}) of OPT(θ) or of Eθ[OPT(θ)], respectively.
In the quasilinear setting, (5) simplifies to the no-overbidding assumption Ea[Wi(ai, X(a))] ≤
Ea[vi(X(a))] that was introduced in [29], and that is a generalization of the no-overbidding as-
sumptions previously used in the literature [5, 3, 4]. That is, players cannot pay more than their
respective value, regardless of the other players’ actions.
Proof. For the complete information setting, we show that∑
i
uθii (a) ≥ λ · ÔPT− µ1
∑
i
pi(a) − µ2
∑
i
Wi(ai, Xi(a)) .
Using (5),
(1 + µ2)
[∑
i
uθii (a) +
∑
i
pi(a)
]
≥ λÔPT− (µ1 − 1)
∑
i
pi(a) .
By doing a case distinction over µ ≤ 1 and µ > 1, we get the claimed result.
For the incomplete information setting, we arrive at
Eθ
[∑
i
uθii (s(θ))
]
≥ λEθ [ÔPT]− µ1Eθ
[∑
i
pi(s(θ))
]
− µ2Eθ
[∑
i
Wi(si(θi), Xi(s(θ)))
]
.
16
The result now follows by using the no-overbidding assumption (5) and case distinction, similar
to the full information case.
In a second-price auction, the winner has to pay the second highest bid, the other players do
not pay anything. In the quasilinear setting it is weakly (1, 0, 1)-smooth.
C.2 Risk-Averse Utilities
We will assume the following pointwise condition:
Definition 17 (Pointwise No-Overbidding). A randomized strategy profile a satisfies the pointwise
no-overbidding assumption if for every player i and every action in the support of a the following
holds:
Wi(ai,x) := max
a−i:X(a)=x
pi(a) ≤ vi(x) ,
i.e. no player is pointwise bidding in a way that she could potentially pay more than her value,
subject to her allocation remaining the same.
Theorem 18. If a mechanism is weakly (λ, µ1, µ2)-smooth with respect to quasilinar utility func-
tions (uˆvii )i∈N,vi∈Vi , the actions in the support of the smoothness deviations satisfy uˆi(a
∗
i , a−i) ≥
0, ∀a−i, ∀i, then any Correlated Equilibrium in the full information setting and any Bayes-Nash
Equilibrium in the Bayesian setting that satisfies the pointwise no-overbidding assumption achieves
efficiency at least λ2·(µ2+max{µ1,1}) of the expected optimal even in the presence of risk-averse bid-
ders.
Proof. First, we show that weak smoothness with respect to quasilinear utility functions with the
additional constraint that players have non-negative utility from the smoothness deviation implies
weak smoothness with respect to risk-averse players.
Lemma 19. If a mechanism is weakly (λ, µ1, µ2)-smooth with respect to quasilinear utility func-
tions (uˆvii )i∈N,vi∈Vi and the actions in the support of the smoothness deviations satisfy uˆi(a
∗
i , a−i) ≥
0, ∀a−i, ∀i, then the mechanism is weakly (λ/2, µ1, µ2)-smooth with respect to risk-averse utility
functions (uvii )i∈N,vi∈Vi .
Proof. We start from an arbitrary action profile a and want to satisfy Definition 2. Since there
exist smoothness deviations s.t. uˆi(a
∗
i , a−i) = vi(x(a
∗
i , a−i)) − pi ≥ 0, ∀a−i, ∀i, we know from
property 4 of the risk aversion definition that uvii (a
∗
i , a−i) ≥ uˆvii (x(a∗i , a−i)). Therefore,∑
i
uvii (a
∗
i , a−i) ≥
∑
i
uˆvii (a
∗
i , a−i) ≥ λÔPT− µ1
∑
i
pi(a)− µ2
∑
i
Wi(ai, X(a))
≥ λ
2
OPT− µ1
∑
i
pi(a)− µ2
∑
i
Wi(ai, X(a)) ,
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 1.
Next, we will show that pointwise no-overbidding indeed implies the no-overbidding assump-
tion (5):
Using the pontwise no-overbidding assumption vi(x) ≥ pi, we know that uvii (x, pi) ≥ vi(x)−pi.
From here, Wi(ai,x) ≤ vi(x) ≤ uvii (a) + pi(a), so we can conclude that
Ea[Wi(ai, X(a))] ≤ Ea[uvii (a) + pi(a)] .
Theorem 16 now completes the proof.
Using that the second-price auction is weakly (1, 0, 1)-smooth with respect to quasilinear utili-
ties, we immediately get that its price of anarchy is also constant in the risk-averse setting.
Corollary 20. Under normalized risk-averse utilities, the second-price auction has a constant
price of anarchy for correlated and Bayes-Nash equilibria with pointwise no-overbidding.
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D Budget Constraints
The techniques and results so far have striking similarities to settings with budget constraints,
where players do not have quasilinear preferences already in the risk neutral case. As it turns
out, under very mild additional assumptions, we can also add (a generalized form of) hard budget
constraints to our consideration.
We now assume that types are pairs θi = (vi, Bi), where Bi : Xi → R+ is an outcome-dependent
budget function. Depending on which outcome is achieved, the agent may have different amounts
of liquidity. We assume that there is a normalized risk-averse utility function uvii such that for a
player of type θi = (vi, Bi)
uθii (x, pi) =
{
uvii (x, pi) if pi ≤ Bi(x)
−∞ otherwise .
In the budgeted setting, one cannot hope to achieve full welfare. This is due to low budget
participants not being able to maximize their contribution. Therefore, we will replace OPT(θ) in
the price-of-anarchy and smoothness definition by the optimal effective or liquid welfare, given
as maxx,p
∑
imin{uθii (x, pi) + pi, Bi(x)}. This benchmark, introduced in [6], reflects that players
with low budgets cannot be expected to be effective at maximizing their own value.
The effect of budgets on efficiency in the risk neutral case was already studied in [29], where the
authors, in order to be able to prove efficiency bounds, introduced the notion of a conservatively
smooth mechanism that has the following additional assumption on the smoothness deviations:
max
a−i
pi(a
∗
i (v, ai), a−i) ≤ max
x
vi(x) . (6)
Conservatively smooth mechanisms are then shown to allow the budgeted scenario without any
further loss of efficiency. Note that (6) is a weaker assumption than the Condition (1) we ask for.
Therefore, we can easily extend our results for risk-averse bidders to the budgeted setting.
Our main result is that if the type space is chosen in a way that taking the pointwise minimum
of a valuation function and a budget function yields again a feasible valuation function, meaning
that we stay within the “permitted” valuation space when applying the budget costraints, then
the price-of-anarchy guarantee is again preserved. The valuation space being closed under capping
is a crucial requirement both for our result and the result in [29].
Theorem 21. If a mechanism is (λ, µ)-smooth w.r.t. quasilinear utility functions (uˆvii )i∈N,vi∈Vi ,
its valuation space is closed under capping with budget functions, the actions in the support of the
smoothness deviations satisfy uˆi(a
∗
i , a−i) ≥ 0, ∀a−i, ∀i, then the social welfare at any Correlated
Equilibrium and at any Bayes-Nash Equilibrium is at least λ2·max{1,µ} of the expected maximum
effective welfare even in the presence of risk-averse bidders.
As before, we prove a lemma connecting smoothness with respect to quasilinear utilities to
smoothness with respect to risk-averse ones.
Lemma 22. If a mechanism is (λ, µ)- smooth w.r.t. quasilinear utility functions (uˆvii )i∈N,vi∈Vi , its
valuation space is closed under capping with the budget functions, and the actions in the support of
the smoothness deviations satisfy uˆi(a
∗
i , a−i) ≥ 0, ∀a−i, ∀i, then the mechanism is (λ/2, µ)-smooth
with respect to risk-averse budgeted utility functions (uθii )θi∈Θi,i∈N .
Proof. We start from an arbitrary action profile a and keep in mind that the risk-averse budgeted
utility function uθii has type θi = (vi, Bi). By uˆ
v¯i , we denote the quasilinear utility of player i
with the capped valuation function v¯i. Formally,
uˆv¯ii (x, pi) = v¯i(x)− pi = min{vi(x), Bi(x)} − pi .
Since the valuation space is closed under capping with the budget function, we can find smoothness
deviations a∗i (v¯, ai) s.t. uˆ
v¯i
i (X(a
∗
i , a−i), pi(a
∗
i , a−i)) = v¯i(X(a
∗
i , a−i)) − pi(a∗i , a−i) ≥ 0, ∀a−i and
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therefore uv¯ii (a
∗
i , a−i) ≥ uˆv¯ii (a∗i , a−i). It follows that∑
i
uθii (a
∗
i (v¯, ai), a−i) =
∑
i
uvii (a
∗
i (v¯, ai), a−i) ≥
∑
i
uv¯ii (a
∗
i , a−i) ≥
∑
i
uˆv¯ii (a
∗
i , a−i)
≥ λ · ÔPTv¯ − µ ·
∑
i
pi(a) ≥ λ
2
·OPTv¯ − µ ·
∑
i
pi(a) ,
where the first equality holds because the deviations are such that the payments are below the
budgets, the first inequality because
uvii (a) = h (vi(x(a) − pi(a)) ≥ h(min{vi(x(a)), Bi} − pi(a)) = uv¯ii (a), ∀a ,
and the third because the valuation space is closed under capping.
The generality of Theorem 3 allows us to now obtain Theorem 21. Note that OPTv¯, where
v¯ is the vector of capped valuation functions, indeed aligns correctly with the effective welfare
benchmark.
E Missing Details from Section 6
E.1 Calculations
E[u3(b
′
3,b−3)] ≤ (1− ε) · (
1
3
· lnM/2− b′3) + ε · (−(16 ·
1
3
· lnM/2− 1) ·M2 · b′3)
<
1
3
· lnM/2− b′3 −
1
M2
· (16 · 1
3
· lnM/2− 1) ·M2 · b′3
=
1
3
· lnM/2− b′3(1 + 16 ·
1
3
· lnM/2− 1)
<
1
3
lnM/2− 1
16
· 16 · 1
3
lnM/2 = 0 .
β(v1) ≥
∫ v1
1/2
2(1− M−1M2 )(et − 1)
2(t− 12 )(1 − M−1M2 ) + (1− 2(t− 12 )(1− M−1M2 )) · et
dt
>
∫ v1
1/2
3
2 (e
t − 1)
2t− 1 + 2 · et dt =
3
4
∫ v1
1/2
et − 1
et + t− 12
dt
≥ 3
4
∫ v1
1/2
(
1− 1√
e
)
dt =
3
4
(
1− 1√
e
)(
v1 − 1
2
)
>
1
4
(
v1 − 1
2
)
.
E[u3(b
′
3,b−3)] ≤ Pr[β(v1) ≤ b′3] · (v3 − b′3)− Pr[β(v1) > b′3] · 32 · v3 · b′3
< 2 · 4b′3(v3 − b′3)− (1− 2 · 4b′3) · 32 · v3 · b′3
= 8b′3v3 − 8(b′3)2 − 32b′3v3 + 8 · 32v3(b′3)2
= 8b′3
(− 3v3 + b′3(32v3 − 1)) ≤ 8b′3
(
−3v3 + 2v3 − 1
16
)
= 8b′3
(
−v3 − 1
16
)
< 0 .
E.2 All-Pay Auction with Limited Risk-Aversion
Theorem 23. In an all-pay auction with risk-averse players whose utilities are of the form
h(vi(x) − pi), where h is a concave function s.t. h(x) = C · x for x < 0, C ≥ 1 constant,
the Price of Anarchy is at most 4(C + 1).
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Proof. We use the following smoothness deviation: the highest value player with value vh devi-
ates to 12vh and everybody else to 0. Now, it is easy to see that the following inequality holds
independent of whether the highest value player obtains the item or not
uvhh (
vh
2
, a−i) ≥ 1
2
vh − (C + 1)max
i6=h
ai ≥ 1
2
ÔPT− (C + 1)
∑
i
ai ,
so then ∑
i
uvii (a
∗
i , a−i) ≥
1
2
ÔPT− (C + 1)
∑
i
pi(a) ≥ 1
4
OPT− (C + 1)
∑
i
pi(a) .
The claim follows by applying Theorem 3.
E.3 Symmetric BNE of All-Pay Auction in the Quasilinear Setting
Claim 24. In a symmetric BNE of the all-pay auction in the quasilinear setting, all bids are
bounded by the expected value of a player.
Proof. Due to symmetry, it is enough to argue about the first player. Let β denote the equilibrium
bidding function. We fix player 1’s value v1 = x and consider his expected utility for bidding y:
E[ux1(b1 = y, b2 = β(v2))] = Pr[β(v2) < y] · (x − y) + Pr[β(v2) ≥ y] · (−y)
= Pr[β(v2) < y] · x− y = F (β−1(y)) · x− y .
By taking the derivative and setting it to zero, we arrive at
f(β−1(b))
β′(β−1(b))
· x− 1 = 0 ,
so
β′(x) = x · f(x) .
Now it is obvious that
β(x) =
∫ x
0
t · f(t) ≤ E[v1] .
F Proof of Observation 1
Proof. Consider two bidders that both have a valuation of 1. If they both bid 1 with probability
1
2 and 0 with the remaining probability, but in a correlated manner, such that always just one
player submits a non-zero bid – they will be in an equilibrium. Let us now calculate the utilities:
ui(b) = Ea∼b[uˆi(a)] −
√
E[uˆ2i (a)]− (E[uˆi(a)])2 =
1
2
−
√
1
2
−
(1
2
)2
=
1
2
− 1
2
= 0 .
Since the payments are also 0, the social welfare in this equilibrium is 0, meaning that the price
of anarchy is unbounded.
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